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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
This thesis examines the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the 
global war on terrorism.  It focuses on NATO’s objectives in this conflict and the 
obstacles to an increased global role for the Atlantic Alliance.  The thesis begins with an 
examination of NATO’s response to the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 
September 2001.  It then examines NATO’s key objectives in combating terrorism, 
including acquiring the requisite capabilities to respond to global threats.  After an 
overview of these major objectives, the key trans-Atlantic obstacles to such an increased 
global role are analyzed.  This topic is important because NATO’s future relevance as the 
central vehicle for trans-Atlantic security and defense cooperation is at stake.   
B. BACKGROUND 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 irrevocably altered the international 
security environment.  Only a decade after the conclusion of the Cold War, a new global 
strategic menace surfaced – the threat posed by the nexus of international terrorist 
organizations, the countries that aid these groups, and the potential access of these actors 
to weapons of mass destruction.  The United States, in response to these attacks, launched 
what it has called “the global war on terrorism.”1  President George W. Bush summarized 
the U.S. approach in this new war when he said,  
We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the 
worst threats before they emerge.  In the world we have entered, the only 
path to safety is the path of action.2  
 
 
                                                 
1 In this thesis, the author defines the global war on terrorism as: “Active and on-going offensive and 
defensive operations of a global scope against terrorist groups and state entities who sponsor and support 
terrorist groups.  Included in this campaign are efforts to counter the threat posed by weapons of mass 
destruction in the hands of such actors.”  While an officially agreed definition does not exist, the term 
“global war on terrorism” is used throughout the U.S. Government to describe the activities outlined above.  
(For an example, please see:  [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html]. 
2 President George W. Bush, Speech at West Point, 1 June 2002.  Quoted from the National Strategy 
for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), p. 11.  
1 
This path of action includes defeating terrorist organizations and denying 
sponsorship and sanctuary to such groups.  American policy explicitly states that “the 
United States and its friends and allies will secure a world in which our children can live 
free from fear and where the threat of terrorist attacks does not define our daily lives.”3 
This new threat has prompted a vigorous debate within the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization on what role it should have in this global campaign.  NATO was established 
in 1949 to protect the territorial sovereignty of its member states.  The Strategic Concept 
adopted by the North Atlantic Council in 1991 reemphasized this purpose: 
The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever 
be used except in self-defense…  The role of the Alliance’s military forces 
is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its 
member states, and thus to contribute to peace and stability in Europe.4    
While NATO evolved from a collective defense alliance to an organization with a 
greater collective security role in the 1990’s, notably with interventions and peacekeeping 
operations in the Balkans, it still limited itself to operations within Europe, the 
Mediterranean Sea, and the North Atlantic Ocean.  Yet, the threat of terrorism coupled 
with weapons of mass destruction, what NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson 
described as the “greatest security challenge of the new century,”5 and the corresponding 
global campaign to defeat this threat have brought about a radical redefinition of NATO’s 
primary role as a guarantor of territorial sovereignty and security in the Euro-Atlantic 
region.    
At the core of this radical shift in NATO doctrine is the prospect of transitioning 
from a security alliance focused on the Euro-Atlantic region to an organization 
possessing the political will and military ability to operate on a global scale as a 
participant in the campaign against terrorism.  Such a doctrinal shift would entail a 
substantial transformation of the Atlantic Alliance from its foundational missions because 
it would require an ability and willingness to act globally to project power, stabilize 
                                                 
3 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.:  The White House, February 2003) 
p. 12, emphasis added.   
4 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7 November 1991, paragraph 36.   
5 Tackling Terror: NATO’s New Mission.  Speech by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson to the 
American Enterprise Institute, 20 June 2002.  Available at: 
[http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020620a.htm]. 11 May 2003.   
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specific regions, and use force – if necessary – to counter terrorist threats to Alliance 
members and international security.  The imperative requirement for this transition 
cannot be ignored by the Atlantic Alliance.  Senior NATO official Michael Rühle has 
argued that the dramatic “changes in the international security environment had become 
too fundamental to allow for business as usual.  Both the transatlantic relationship in 
general, and NATO in particular, have had to adapt to the realization that the immediate 
post-Cold War period has ended and a new, still undefined era has begun.”6   
The result of this change in the trans-Atlantic security environment has been the 
call by many NATO member countries, led by the United States, for a dramatic 
transformation of NATO to enable it to play an increased global role. Rühle states that 
such a transition is vital to NATO’s future survival because if NATO was “unable or 
unwilling to play such a role, it would become completely detached from the US security 
agenda,” and such detachment from NATO’s leading member would likely cause 
NATO’s decline as a vibrant security institution.7  Many influential policy-makers and 
scholars, in addition to many NATO governments, share this sentiment.  They argue that 
the relevance of NATO in the 21st century is directly related to its effectiveness as a 
participant in this global war on terrorism.8  Senator Richard Lugar (Republican of 
Indiana), chairman of the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations, and a respected 
NATO observer, eloquently stated this position during an April 2003 committee hearing:   
With [U.S.] forces heavily engaged in Iraq, this Committee and the Senate 
must consider what role NATO can and should play in the global war on 
terrorism.  NATO has to decide if it wants to participate in the security 
challenge of our time.  It has to decide whether it wants to be relevant in 
addressing the major threat to the safety and economic well being of the 
                                                 
6 Michael Rühle, “NATO After Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11,” Parameters, US Army War 
College Quarterly, Summer 2003, p. 91. 
7 Ibid. 
8 An example of legislators in a NATO member government agreeing with this premise can be found 
in the United Kingdom’s House of Commons Defence Committee report, The Future of NATO.  “The 
threat which terrorism poses to global security was suddenly perceived as more pressing and dangerous, 
because of the scale of the attacks, their goal of mass casualties, their perpetration by a highly organized 
and mobile terrorist network which acknowledged no boundaries to its activities, and the willingness of 
terrorists to sacrifice their own lives.  As a result of 11 September, and if the Alliance is to be relevant 
against a threat which no longer has borders, the transformation which NATO has effected to date in its 
role and missions since the end of the Cold War will require another step change.”  House of Commons 
Defence Committee, The Future of NATO, Seventh Report of Session 2001-02, HC 914 (London: The 
Stationary Office Limited, 31 July 2002), p. 15, par. 23. 
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citizens of its component countries.  If we do not prevent major terrorist 
attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, the Alliance will have 
failed in the most fundamental sense of defending our nations and our way 
of life.9 
However, some observers oppose such a globalized function for NATO.  Steve 
Larrabee, holder of the Corporate Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation, 
in responding to such opposition has written that it is imperative that NATO realize that 
“the threats facing the Alliance are more diverse and geographically distant than during 
the Cold War.”10  He argues that those who oppose a global role for NATO and prefer an 
Alliance that remains focused on threats within Europe and its immediate periphery 
operate from a perception that is “anachronistic and wrong-headed.”  Such a view “fails 
to recognize the degree to which the nature and locus of the challenges facing Europe and 
the United States have changed since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.”11    
Even if the notion that NATO must become a politically committed and militarily 
capable participant in the global campaign against terrorism to remain relevant is 
generally accepted, significant trans-Atlantic obstacles to such a transformation remain.  
This thesis, in addition to examining NATO’s stated objectives in the war against 
terrorism, analyzes the key political and military obstacles in the trans-Atlantic arena to 
an increased global role for NATO.   
The trans-Atlantic bond, traditionally the core strength of the Alliance, is of 
critical importance for any NATO transformation.  As U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell told the Senate in April 2003, “This great alliance, which has kept the peace for 
more that 50 years, is more than a treaty for collective defense, it is the central organizing 
force in a great web of relationships that holds North America and Europe together.”12 
 
                                                 
9 Richard Lugar, Statement at the 8 April 2003 Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
“The Role of NATO Today.”  Available at: [www.expandnato.org/dicklnato3.html].  11 May 2003.   
10 Steve Larrabee & François Heisbourg, “How Global A Role Can and Should NATO Play?”  NATO 
Review, Spring 2003.  Available at [www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/debate.html].  14 May 
2003.   
11 Ibid. 
12 Colin Powell quoted in Nicholas Burns, “NATO Has Adapted: An Alliance With A New Mission,” 
International Herald Tribune, 24 May 2003.   
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C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is based on primary and secondary sources.  The primary sources 
include NATO communiqués relating to the Alliance’s new roles, missions and proposed 
initiatives.  In addition, personal interviews with NATO and government officials 
conducted by the author at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, and at Supreme 
Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, compose a critical 
element of the body of research.  The secondary sources include works by political-
military analysts in professional journals, newspapers, and other publications.  Other 
secondary sources include the author’s interviews with expert observers outside 
government in Europe and North America.   
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II examines the NATO response to 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and NATO’s primary objectives in the global 
war on terrorism.  It reviews the key components of NATO’s transformation in strategic 
focus.  These components include NATO’s new Military Concept for Defense Against 
Terrorism, its participation in operations beyond Europe and North America, and the 
dramatic changes in NATO’s military command structure.   
Chapter II then analyzes the Prague Capabilities Commitment and Allied 
Command Transformation as key elements in transforming NATO’s capabilities.  The 
PCC addresses the requirements for enhancements in the capabilities, tactics, and 
interoperability of NATO forces in order to project power beyond the traditional area of 
NATO operations more effectively.  Allied Command Transformation is designed to 
keep NATO fully aligned with rapid operational and technological changes.  This 
function is critical in order for the Alliance to remain effective since the forces of 
member nations must be interoperable and integrated to fight in a unified manner.  
Chapter II concludes with an examination of the NATO Response Force (NRF).  The 
NRF is designed to be a flexible, interoperable and deployable joint force that draws from 
a rotational pool of combat forces that could be rapidly adapted to specific missions.   
Chapter III examines the key trans-Atlantic obstacles to NATO playing an 
increasingly important role in the global campaign against terrorism.  In order for NATO 
to become an active and effective participant in this campaign, it must undergo a 
5 
substantial transformation.  However, significant trans-Atlantic political and military 
obstacles must be overcome before this ambitious vision can be realized.  Since NATO 
makes its decisions by consensus, a strategic policy rift between Alliance members can 
cause paralysis.  The issues covered in this chapter include opposition in Europe to the 
new U.S. national security strategy of preemption, the strain on the trans-Atlantic 
relationship due to anti-Americanism in some circles in Europe, and the possible 
emergence of competing views of international order in Europe and the United States.  
Chapter III also assesses the key military obstacles facing the Alliance with a 
particular focus on the core competencies required for sustained global operations and the 
threat to Alliance cohesion and effectiveness posed by the widening trans-Atlantic 
capabilities gap.  Lessons from Operation Allied Force, NATO’s air campaign against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, are examined in addition to shortfalls in the 
critical areas of defense spending, force structure, and interoperability. 
The final chapter offers conclusions regarding NATO’s emerging global role in 
the war on terrorism.  The chapter synthesizes the key findings and recommends possible 
solutions to the challenges facing the Atlantic Alliance as it undergoes this strategic 
metamorphosis.    
6 
II. NATO’S OBJECTIVES IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION: NATO’S RESPONSE TO 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 
On 11 September 2001, at a time when some observers had doubts about the 
utility of the Atlantic Alliance in the post-Cold War world, NATO’s future changed 
dramatically with the terrorist attacks on the United States.  Whether NATO can adapt to 
combat this new threat from terrorism is a critical issue for its relevance in the 21st 
century.  To answer this question, it is important to examine what NATO has done and 
what it proposes to do in order to be an active participant in the global war on terrorism. 
On 12 September 2001, less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks on the United 
States, the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s governing body, invoked Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the Alliance’s history.  In doing so, NATO 
declared that the attack against the United States was to be regarded as an attack against 
all 19 NATO allies.  Article 5 of the North Atlantic (or Washington) Treaty reads in part:   
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area.13  
This invocation of Article 5 demonstrated NATO’s intent to play a role in the 
response to the 11 September attacks.  In response to requests for assistance from the 
United States, NATO allies took several measures to support the global war on terrorism.  
These measures included granting blanket over-flight rights and access to airfields and 
bases for U.S. forces during Operation Enduring Freedom (the United States-led military 
response to the 11 September attacks) in addition to enhanced intelligence sharing on the 
terrorist threat.   
                                                 
13 “What is Article V?”  Available at [http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm].  17 November 2003.  
7 
One of the more significant forms of support was the first-ever deployment of 
NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to assist the United 
States in patrolling American airspace.14  NATO’s Operation Eagle Assist, as it was 
known, was active from mid-October 2001 through mid-May 2002.  Over 830 
crewmembers from 13 NATO countries flew 4,300 hours and over 360 operational 
sorties.15  This operation was critical as it allowed U.S. Air Force AWACS aircraft to be 
transferred to the Middle East for support to operations over Afghanistan.   
Another critical NATO contribution to the fight against international terrorism has 
been Operation Active Endeavor.  On 26 October 2001, warships from NATO’s Standing 
Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) were sent to the eastern Mediterranean 
to monitor merchant shipping and conduct continuous patrols in the area.  Merchant 
interdiction operations (MIO) continue to be a critical element in combating terrorists.  
Since the genesis of Operation Enduring Freedom, there has been an ongoing concern 
that terrorist leaders may attempt to escape by sea.16  For this reason, great emphasis has 
been placed on the role of MIO in not only finding terrorists, but also intercepting 
weapons of mass destruction.   
It would not be possible to establish this “net at sea” effectively without the 
ongoing commitment of NATO countries, especially during the more intensive phases of 
Operation Enduring Freedom when U.S. naval forces were actively supporting combat 
operations in Afghanistan.  NATO’s supporting role in MIO freed these American naval 
assets for other combat support missions.  As of October 2003, “about 36,000 merchant 
vessels” had been monitored, and those that have raised suspicion have been signaled, 
                                                 
14 NATO possesses AWACS aircraft that are owned collectively and operated by NATO’s military 
command structure.  This was the first deployment of NATO assets outside the European theater of 
operations.   
15 The Key to the Prague Summit – An Agenda for Change from NATO Online Documents.  
Available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/in_focus/prague-presskit-e.pdf], p. 17. 11 
November 2003.   
16 This analysis is based on the author’s experience as a member of the intelligence staff for 
Commander, Task Force-50 (CTF-50) from 12 September 2001 to 18 December 2001. CTF-50 was the 
overall commander for all coalition naval forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. There existed credible 
evidence that leaders of Al Qaeda may attempt to escape Afghanistan by sea and CTF-50 was charged with 
not only contributing roughly one half of all combat air sorties over Afghanistan but in intercepting any 
possible Al Qaeda members at sea.   
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shadowed and documented, and in some cases boarded.17  In February 2003, the North 
Atlantic Council decided to extend the scope of Operation Active Endeavor to include 
escorting non-military ships traveling through the Strait of Gibraltar in order to maintain 
security in the area and to secure the safe transit of designated Allied ships.  The narrow 
Strait of Gibraltar is widely recognized as a potential site for terrorist attacks.  Operation 
Active Endeavor, which involves the navies of many NATO countries, continues to be a 
critical NATO contribution to the global war on terrorism.18  
While the invocation of Article 5 and the commencement of the two 
aforementioned NATO operations immediately after 11 September 2001 were dramatic, 
they were only the beginning of NATO’s transformation into an Alliance with both the 
global reach and the military capability to deal effectively with the asymmetric threats at 
hand.  This chapter investigates NATO’s key objectives in the war on terrorism and the 
corresponding global role such participation entails.  In order to do so effectively, this 
chapter concentrates on NATO’s remarkable shift in strategic focus since 11 September 
2001 and its goals in transforming and improving military capabilities.  The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the nascent NATO Response Force, heralded as the 
centerpiece for NATO operations in the 21st century.   
B. TRANSFORMING NATO’S STRATEGIC FOCUS:  DEFENSE AGAINST 
TERRORISM, OUT OF AREA OPERATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGES 
Since the events of 11 September 2001, NATO has begun a process of 
transforming itself – including a radical shift in its strategic focus.  In describing NATO’s 
metamorphosis, E. V. Buckley, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Defense 
Planning and Operations, stated that such transformation  
goes beyond military transformation of the technological kind.  It involves 
the adaptation of NATO’s structures, capabilities, policies, doctrines and 
relationships to better suit current and perceived security challenges.19   
                                                 
17 “Operation Active Endeavor.”  Available at 
[http://www.afsouth.nato.int/operations/Endeavour/Endeavour.htm].  10 January 2004.    
18 The Key to the Prague Summit – An Agenda for Change from NATO Online Documents.  
Available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0211-prague/in_focus/prague-presskit-e.pdf], p. 6, 11 
November 2003.   
19 “NATO and ESDP.” Speech by E. V. Buckley, NATO Assistance Secretary for Defense Planning 
and Operations, to the George C. Marshall Center Conference, Berlin, 8 April 2003.     
9 
The remarkable transformation in NATO’s strategic focus can best be seen in its 
Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism, its execution of out-of-area operations, 
and its dramatic institutional changes.   
In December 2001, NATO’s Defense Ministers tasked NATO’s Military 
Authorities with preparing a Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism for 
approval by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).20  The Military Authorities in turn 
requested political guidance from the North Atlantic Council in March 2002 on a number 
of specific issues, including constraints, geographical scope and the definition of 
“defense” – e.g., whether that could include offensive action.  At the Reykjavik 
ministerial meeting in May 2002, there was intense debate over the language for the final 
communiqué.  According to a Rand report, several Allies advocated the inclusion of a 
statement that NATO was “prepared to combat terrorism globally and that there would be 
no limits on NATO’s global reach for such operations.”21  France objected to giving 
NATO an explicitly global role.  However, in the final communiqué, an implicit global 
role was granted to NATO when the ministers agreed that “NATO must be able to field 
forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over 
distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”22  What was most significant about this 
meeting was that the Allies agreed to give NATO a global role in combating terrorism – a 
dramatic change for the venerable alliance. 
After the May 2002 ministerial meeting, the NAC delivered its political guidance 
for the military concept on 12 June 2002.  This comprehensive political document stated 
that NATO’s military forces would help “deter, defend, disrupt and protect against 
attacks or threats of attacks, directed from abroad, including by acting against terrorists 
and those who harbor them.”23  The NAC also declared that defense against terrorism 
                                                 
20 Some of this information on the Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism comes from 
interviews conducted with observers in Europe in September 2003.   
21 Nora Bensahel, The Counterterror Coalitions:  Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European 
Union, MR-1746 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), p. 24. 
22 “Final Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Reykjavik on 14 
May 2002,” Press Release M-NAC-1 (2002) 59, 14 May 2002. 
23 “NATO’s Role in Combating Terrorism.”  Speech by E. V. Buckley, NATO Assistance Secretary 
for Defense Planning and Operations, to the NATO-Russia Conference on the Role of the Military in 
Combating Terrorism, Moscow, 9 December 2002.     
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must be multifaceted and comprehensive and that it was better to deter and prevent 
terrorist attacks than to deal with their consequences.  Most strikingly, the North Atlantic 
Council, echoing the sentiment of the Reykjavik Communiqué, stated in its Political 
Guidance that NATO forces must “be prepared to deploy as and where required to deal 
with particular circumstances as they arise.”24   
Shortly after this guidance was issued, NATO’s Military Committee proposed a 
new military concept to the NAC in October 2002.  This concept was officially adopted 
at the Prague Summit in November 2002.  A central component of the Military Concept 
is that it establishes four categories of military operations under the aegis of “defense 
against terrorism.”  These four categories are anti-terrorism, consequence management, 
counter-terrorism, and military cooperation.  Incorporated into all four categories is the 
essential element of force protection, which is based on up-to-date threat assessments and 
is fundamental to any military plan designed for defending against terrorism.   
Anti-terrorism is defined by the Military Concept as the use of defensive 
measures to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property.  It explicitly 
states that nations have the primary responsibility for the defense of their populations and 
infrastructure.  However, there are roles for the Alliance if a nation requests support.  
Such roles include improving the effectiveness and responsiveness of NATO’s integrated 
air defense system, providing missile defense, and assisting a nation wishing to withdraw 
its citizens from an area of increased terrorist threat.  The Military Concept identified 
timely and accurate intelligence and a NATO standardized threat-warning system as 
essential requirements for the success of anti-terrorism operations.    
Consequence management is the use of reactive measures to mitigate the 
destructive effects of terrorism.  NATO military contributions to consequence 
management encompass planning and force generation, including the deployment of 
specialized assistance, such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
defense capabilities.  On 1 December 2003, NATO made a substantial improvement in its 
consequence management capabilities with the establishment of the Multinational 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Battalion.  The CBRN 
                                                 
24 “NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.”  Available at 
[http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm].  10 January 2004.   
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Battalion, based in Liberec, Czech Republic, is NATO’s “new capability designed to 
respond and defend against the use of weapons of mass destruction both inside and 
beyond NATO’s area of responsibility.”25    
The Concept also called for the creation of an Alliance Registry of capabilities 
available on short notice to support national efforts in dealing with the effects of terrorist 
attacks.  It called, moreover, for the establishment of an enhanced training and exercise 
coordination capacity for the development of multi-national response options to deal with 
terrorist attacks; and it identified NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination 
Cell as the potential nucleus for such efforts.   
The third pillar of NATO’s Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism is 
counter-terrorism.  Counter-terrorism is offensive military action designed to reduce 
terrorists’ capabilities.  The NATO Allies agree that terrorists should not be allowed to 
base, train, plan, stage and execute terrorist actions and that such a threat may justify 
acting against these terrorists and those who harbor them.  Such operations will be of a 
joint nature and will utilize psychological and information operations extensively in order 
to gain the trust of the local population.  The Military Concept addresses two broad roles 
for NATO’s involvement in counter-terrorist operations: NATO in the lead and NATO in 
support.   
With NATO in the lead, the Military Concept states that the Alliance must have 
adequate command and control and intelligence structures along with forces “trained, 
exercised and maintained” at appropriate readiness levels.  While the improvements in 
capabilities for traditional joint operations are largely the same as those required for 
counter-terrorist operations, the Military Concept urges that NATO consider adopting 
procedures and capabilities needed to “support accelerated decision cycles, in order to be 
successful in detecting and attacking time sensitive targets in the Counter Terrorist  
 
                                                 
25 “Launch of NATO Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion.”  Available at 
[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p031126e.htm].  13 January 2004.   
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environment.”26  In order to achieve such success, NATO requires forces capable of 
conducting strike operations with precision-guided stand-off munitions and directing 
conventional fires in addition to specialized anti-terrorist forces.    
With NATO in support, the Alliance would provide assets and capabilities to 
support operations against terrorism.  Such support could take various forms: as a 
“coalition enabler” and interoperability provider, as a means of back-filling national 
requirements,27 or as a source of Host Nation Support and logistics assistance to include 
overflight and basing rights.  Moreover, NATO’s extensive operational planning 
capabilities could be utilized to plan a mission and generate a force to support counter-
terrorist operations.   
The final pillar of the Military Concept is military cooperation.  It is generally 
agreed that military action alone will not be enough to deal with the terrorist threat and 
that any “military operations should be coordinated and implemented in a coherent 
manner with diplomatic, economic, social, legal and information initiatives.”28  In most 
nations, the civil authorities, including law enforcement, intelligence and security 
services, are the main agencies involved in countering terrorism.  Therefore, NATO 
“military forces will need to operate in support of, and in close coordination with all these 
agencies”29 in order to be truly effective against terrorism.  Inherent in military 
cooperation is strengthening NATO’s relationships with other international organizations 
and Partnership for Peace countries.  The Military Concept states “that the trust, 
transparency and interaction already developed through these relationships serve as an 
excellent vehicle for the further co-ordination of measures to combat terrorism,” and it 
urges that these relationships be further developed.30     
                                                 
26 “NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.”  Available at 
[http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm].  10 January 2004.   
27 For example, NATO deployed aircraft to the United States in order to free U.S. AWACS to deploy 
to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom.   
28 “NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism.”  Available at 




In addition to enunciating four key categories of roles for NATO forces, the 
Military Concept identifies the requisite capabilities and procedures for its effective 
implementation.  The first required capability is effective intelligence.  Success in 
defending against and defeating terrorism is directly linked to improving intelligence 
collection, analysis and dissemination.  NATO’s leaders – from the Secretary General to 
the junior officers on the International Military Staff – agree on the importance of 
producing and sharing intelligence information relating to terrorism in a more timely, 
coherent, and effective manner.  Other required capabilities identified in the Military 
Concept include deployability, readiness, CBRN defense, and effective engagement.  As 
terrorist activities involve little warning and response time, the Military Concept 
concludes by underscoring the need to make Alliance decision-making as effective and 
timely as possible in order to deploy forces appropriately to counter the terrorist threat.  
Besides the Military Concept for Defense Against Terrorism, another example of 
NATO’s shift in strategic focus in order to participate effectively in the global war on 
terrorism is its embrace of operations beyond Europe and North America.  As recently as 
the beginning of 2002, the likelihood that NATO would operate beyond its traditional 
area of responsibility – let alone in another continent – was dubious at best.  NATO’s 
first “out of area” operations took place in 1992, if one takes Article 6 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty as the agreed geographical area of responsibility.  From this perspective, 
all of NATO’s Balkan operations since 1992 have been conducted “out of area.” 
Yet controversy over NATO’s operational role beyond Europe and North 
America was largely put to rest with its assumption of command responsibilities for the 
United Nations Security Council-mandated International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan on 11 August 2003.  ISAF is headquartered in Kabul, and it is 
designed to allow for the peaceful transition from the Taliban regime to a modern 
democratic state by maintaining security so that the Afghan Transitional Authority and 
UN personnel are able to operate in a safe environment.  In addition, ISAF may assist the 
Afghan Transitional Authority in developing and training Afghan security structures and 
forces and in civil reconstruction.31 
                                                 
31 Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “The Road To Kabul,” NATO Review, Summer 2003.  Available at 
[www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art3.html].  21 November 2003.   
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NATO’s first involvement with Afghanistan began with a little known request to 
NATO by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for supply 
assistance for operations in Afghanistan in late 2001.  With little fanfare, NATO 
embarked on its first mission outside Europe or North America.  Since then, NATO’s 
involvement in ISAF has expanded dramatically.  This multinational force of 
approximately 5,500 troops has, from its beginning in December 2001, been composed 
mainly of NATO allies.  Indeed, NATO member countries contribute more than 90% of 
the troops involved in ISAF at any given time.   
ISAF was initiated under British command (ISAF 1) for a six-month rotation, and 
then transferred to Turkish command in July 2002 (ISAF 2).  Germany and the 
Netherlands assumed command of ISAF 3.  NATO played an important role in the 
process of establishing the German-Dutch-led iteration of ISAF when on 27 November 
2002, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, 
hosted a Force Generation Conference.  This was the first time that SHAPE had hosted a 
Force Generation Conference in support of countries that had offered to lead a military 
operation based on a UN Security Council Resolution that was not a NATO-led mission.  
This conference was organized after Germany requested NATO assistance in force 
generation, intelligence, information sharing, and communications.32  In order to end the 
pattern of six-month rotations of ISAF command responsibilities and bring increased 
stability to the mission, the North Atlantic Council decided on 16 April 2003 to “enhance 
NATO’s support for ISAF by taking on the command, coordination and planning of the 
operation, while keeping the same name, banner and mission.”33 
This significant decision, coming shortly after the disagreements among Allies 
over the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq in March-April 2003, was seen as a 
“healing balm” by the Allies; and it may well serve as a model for future NATO 
                                                 
32 “NATO to Support ISAF 3”.  Available at [www.nato.int/docu/update/2002/11-
november/e1127a.htm].  18 November 2003.   
33 Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “The Road to Kabul,” NATO Review, Summer 2003.  Available at 
[www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue2/english/art3.html].  21 November 2003.   
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operations.34  ISAF was the principal issue during the contentious winter of 2002-2003 
on which all the Allies could generally agree.  The Allies recognized their common goals 
regarding Afghanistan and saw in ISAF a way to be tangibly involved in the global war 
on terrorism.  According to a statement published under the authority of the NATO 
Secretary-General, 
taking command of ISAF represents a new departure for the Alliance.  It 
is, however, a natural manifestation of the Alliance’s transformation 
agenda and a demonstration of member states’ resolve to meet new 
security challenges.35 
Another critical component of NATO’s shift in strategic mindset and an example 
of the “transformation agenda” is the restructuring of NATO’s integrated command 
apparatus.  At the Prague Summit in November 2002, the Heads of State and Government 
directed that NATO’s military command structure be streamlined in order to provide “a 
leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable command structure with a view to 
meeting the operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions.”36  Air 
Vice-Marshal Andrew Vallance, Executive Assistant for Command Structure 
Implementation to the Chief of Staff at SHAPE, has described the resulting new NATO 
Command Structure as “the most important development in the Alliance’s military 
organization since NATO’s inception over 50 years ago.”37   
Whereas the previous command structure was largely based on geographic 
divisions of responsibility, this new structure is based on functionality.  NATO’s Military 
Authorities judged that a functionality-based approach to military organizations would 
                                                 
34 The phrase “healing balm” was employed by an authoritative observer in Brussels during an 
interview in September 2003.  According to this observer, missions such as ISAF (Post-Conflict 
Stabilization Phase Operations) may constitute a likely model for future NATO operations since these 
missions generally do not involve politically sensitive issues such as “preventive war” and often involve a 
greater degree of international legitimacy, including U.N. Security Council mandates.  Problems with 
intelligence, command and control, and political oversight are greatly diminished with operations such as 
ISAF compared to offensive military action.     
35 NATO Afghanistan Briefing (October 2003).  Available at 
[http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.htm].  18 November 2003.   
36 Prague Summit Declaration dated 21 November 2002, para 4b.  Available at 
[http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm].  12 November 2003.   
37 Air Vice-Marshall Andrew Vallance, RAF, “Military Matters:  A Radically New Command 
Structure for NATO,” NATO Review, Autumn 2003.  Available at 
[www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue3/english/military.html].  12 January 2003.     
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eliminate duplication, streamline efforts and better promote integration and cohesion.  
During the Cold War (when the predominant mission was to defend territory with static 
in-place forces) a functionality-based command structure was deemed politically 
infeasible and militarily unnecessary.  Since the early 1990’s, however, it has become 
increasingly clear that NATO faces a new strategic environment that is “more dynamic, 
fluid and resource-conscious.”38  Moreover, given the fact that “real-time, global, mass 
data transfer is readily available,” a functionality-based approach is indispensable.39    
At the strategic level, only one command, Allied Command Operations (ACO) 
headquartered at SHAPE, now possesses overall operational responsibilities.  Under this 
new design, ACO provides strategic advice upwards to the North Atlantic Council and 
strategic direction downwards to the operational level headquarters.  
There are three operational headquarters below ACO.  This includes two Joint 
Force Commands (JFC North and JFC South based in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and 
Naples, Italy, respectively) and a Joint Headquarters (JHQ West, based in Lisbon, 
Portugal).  There is, in this new arrangement, a clear devolution of operational authority 
from SHAPE to the two Joint Force Commands.40  Each JFC must be capable of 
providing operational command for any Alliance mission.  JHQ West, however, will have 
a more limited command capability and will be focused on maintaining the capability to 
command Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) from a maritime platform.  This shift in 
operational responsibility will lead to a significant reduction in the SHAPE staff and an 
increase in the capacity of the headquarters at the operational level.  Each JFC will have 
three component commands representing land, air, and maritime assets.  These 
component commands provide a flexible pool of command assets and functional experts 
available to be employed under either JFC.   
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
40 An example of this increased operational responsibility can be seen in the Regional Headquarters 
previously known as Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH).  Until recently, AFNORTH’s 
operational function was limited to conducting exercises and integrating new members into the Alliance.  
Since 2003, AFNORTH (now JFC NORTH) has taken operational command of the ISAF mission in 
Afghanistan as well as serving as the operational command for the first two iterations of the NATO 
Response Force – two high priorities for NATO.   
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This flexibility demonstrates a dramatic departure from the static, geographically 
limited command structure for NATO forces that was in place until only recently.  This 
reorganization, which has resulted in a dramatic decrease in the total number of 
headquarters from twenty to eleven, is a vital and necessary aspect of NATO’s 
transformation in strategic focus and is intended to help the Alliance’s forces become 
more responsive and deployable.  
C. TRANSFORMING NATO’S CAPABILITIES:  THE PRAGUE 
CAPABILITIES COMMITMENT AND ALLIED COMMAND 
TRANSFORMATION  
While changes in NATO’s strategic policies and institutions are necessary to 
combat the threats posed by terrorism, NATO’s leaders have stressed that without a 
transformation in NATO’s capabilities – including improved interoperability, changed 
doctrine and advances in joint warfare – NATO’s relevance and effectiveness will remain 
in question.  Indeed, one of the key decisions at the Prague Summit in November 2002 
was the approval of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC).  The PCC is designed to 
ensure that the Alliance possesses the operational capabilities required to effectively deal 
with the new security threats.  Individual NATO countries have made firm and specific 
political commitments to acquire the capabilities that will enable the Alliance to counter 
the menace of terrorism successfully. 
These improvements in capabilities include the critical areas of chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear defense; intelligence, surveillance and target 
acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; precision 
guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD); strategic air and sea 
lift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units.  
While certainly a vast task, capability enhancement remains a foundational issue for 
NATO’s continued relevance.  However, specific improvements in military capabilities 
are not enough.  In order to combat terrorism and other challenges effectively in the new 
security environment, NATO has recognized that it must, on the strategic level, transform 
how it operates, thinks, and trains.  
A critical step towards such a transformation in both capability and strategic 
effectiveness was the establishment of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) on 19 
18 
June 2003.  ACT supplanted the headquarters for Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), 
a command which was disbanded.  ACT’s role is to promote transformation, 
interoperability, and capabilities enhancement in NATO’s militaries in order to guarantee 
that NATO’s forces are trained and equipped to meet the challenges of the new security 
environment.  To enhance the trans-Atlantic link and facilitate close interaction and 
synchronization with U.S. transformation efforts, ACT is co-located with the U.S. Joint 
Forces Command (USJFCOM) in Norfolk, Virginia.  USJFCOM is intended to serve as 
the transformation engine within the United States military.   
At ACT establishment ceremonies NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson 
stated,  
ACT will shape the future of combined and joint operations.  It will 
identify new concepts, and bring them to maturity.  It will then turn these 
transformational concepts into reality; a reality shared by the entire NATO 
Alliance.41   
According to ACT’s website, its central mission is as follows: 
ACT leads transformation within the Alliance, to include concept 
development and military experimentation.  It also stimulates 
transformation in national forces, and those of NATO’s Partners.  It 
ensures the infusion of research & technology to address shortfalls and 
develop new concepts and doctrine through extensive networks.  ACT is 
responsible for joint training and doctrine development within the 
Alliance.  It also leverages the outputs of NATO Agencies and brings 
coherence to their programs by developing joint doctrine and directing the 
curricula of NATO’s schools and colleges.42   
The transformation of NATO’s capabilities is comprised of five core processes: 
Strategic Concepts, Policy and Interoperability (SCPI); Joint Experimentation, Exercises 
and Assessment (JEEA); Requirements & Capability Planning and Implementation 
(RCPI); Joint Education and Training (JET); and Future Capabilities Research and 
Technology (FCRT).43  SCPI serves as the primary conduit for the introduction of joint 
                                                 
41 “New NATO Transformation Command Established”.  Available at 
[http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/06-june/e0618a.htm].  12 November 2003.     
42 “Allied Command Transformation Fact Sheet.”  Available at [www.nato.int/act].  12 November 
2003. 
43 “ACT’s Mission.”  Available at [http://www.act.nato.int/welcome/mission.html].  12 November 
2003. 
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and combined interoperability doctrine and standardization.  Through the JEEA process, 
ACT conducts joint and combined warfighting experiments and evaluates their outcomes 
for use and implementation throughout the Alliance.  RCPI is the process by which ACT 
identifies requirements and coordinates the development of required capabilities through 
the NATO Defense Planning Process.  Through Joint Education and Training, ACT is 
responsible for the training of all NATO personnel and headquarters’ staffs.  Lastly, the 
Future Capabilities Research and Technology process coordinates NATO research and 
technology initiatives to support the ongoing transformation of NATO’s military 
capabilities.   
In addition to these five key processes in NATO’s transformation, three major 
commands report directly to Allied Command Transformation.  The Joint Analysis 
Lessons Learned Center (JALLC), based in Monsanto, Portugal, is NATO’s central 
agency for the analysis of all NATO military operations, training, experiments and 
exercises.  Analysis requirements will be compiled into a prioritized Bilateral-Strategic 
Command Analysis Requirements List (ARL) that will be developed in close 
coordination with NATO commands and agencies.  This comprehensive list “will reflect 
the broad analysis concerns of NATO regarding doctrine, concepts, procedures, 
structures, organizations, and materiel in order to sustain maximum benefit from analysis 
activities.”44  JALLC’s pivotal duties will include compiling the lessons learned from 
each iteration of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and recommending improvements.45   
Another major command responsible to ACT is the Joint Force Training Center 
(JFTC).  The JFTC is located in Bydgoszcz, Poland, and focuses on joint and combined 
training at the tactical level in order to achieve tactical interoperability among NATO’s 
militaries.   
Lastly, the Joint Warfare Center (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway, promotes and 
conducts NATO’s joint and combined experimentation, analysis and doctrine 
                                                 
44 “Allied Command Transformation Fact Sheet.”  Available at [www.nato.int/act].  12 November 
2003.  
45 The NATO Response Force (NRF) is NATO’s new combined, joint force capable of expeditionary 
operations.  It was officially established 15 October 2003 and will involve different iterations (forces 
assigned and command responsibilities) every six months.  The NRF is the focus of the next section of this 
chapter.  
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development in order to “maximize transformational synergy and to improve NATO’s 
capabilities and interoperability.”46  The JWC will assist ACT in the development of new 
technologies and modeling and simulation, as well as conducting training in the new 
concepts and doctrine for NATO’s joint and combined staffs.   
One of the cornerstones of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation is its 
collaboration with the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).  In 1999, 
USJFCOM was established to serve as the lead transformational command within the 
United States military, and at the Prague Summit in November 2002, NATO took a 
similar course with the establishment of ACT.47  Co-located with USFJCOM 
headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, and commanded by the same officer, ACT is expected 
to fully leverage the transformational gains being made by the United States military and 
to promote the development of a more cohesive and effective Alliance.   
Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, USN, upon assuming command of Joint Forces 
Command in the fall of 2002, indicated that one of his key objectives involved supporting 
the transformation of U.S. and Allied capabilities.48  This objective has been manifest 
throughout the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s staff, in which every directorate (training, 
experimentation, personnel, etc.) has a multinational element.  Specifically, the ACT-
Joint Forces Command link ensures “that NATO forces are jointly integrated and 
interoperable with all Alliance forces undergoing transformation.”49   
For all the dire talk of the “drifting apart” of the Allies in military capability, 
NATO’s Allied Command Transformation stands out as a tangible example of the 
cementing and close synchronization of trans-Atlantic military relations and 
interoperability.  NATO describes this link between the lead transformational commands 
of NATO and the United States as an “institutionalized unity of effort” producing a 
“synergy” that benefits both commands and, ultimately, both the United States and 
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47 Ibid. 
48 “NATO-U.S. Joint Forces Collaboration.”  Available at 
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49 Ibid. 
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NATO as a whole.50  Time will tell to what extent the new Allied Command 
Transformation proves to be a positive agent for transforming NATO’s doctrine and 
capabilities.  Ultimately, of course, NATO’s political leaders must ensure the vitality of 
the Atlantic Alliance, but Allied Command Transformation certainly appears to be a step 
in the right direction as NATO transforms itself to deal with the new security challenges.     
D. THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE:  THE VANGUARD OF NATO’S 
TRANSFORMATION 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld first proposed the creation of the 
NATO Response Force at the September 2002 meeting of NATO defense ministers in 
Warsaw.  The Secretary described the creation of this new force as a concrete way for 
NATO to transform itself in order to take on a more meaningful role in militarily 
combating terrorist threats; and he immediately linked its success to the future relevance 
of NATO as a military organization.  Secretary Rumsfeld said that such a force “would 
be agile, could be deployed rapidly, and would leave a small military presence” and that 
“establishing rapid reaction forces would be a good way for NATO to assure its relevance 
going forward into the 21st century.”51  Secretary Rumsfeld envisioned a joint force that 
would be flexible, interoperable and sustainable.  It would draw from a rotational pool of 
combat forces, and would be able to deploy globally if necessary in order to deal with 
small-scale contingencies or larger, higher-intensity conflicts.   
Less than two months later, at NATO’s Prague Summit in November 2002, the 
Allies approved the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF).  According to the 
Prague Summit Declaration, the NRF will consist “of a technologically advanced, 
flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air 
elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council.”52  
Additionally, NATO has described the NRF as a “tiered readiness joint force, 
expeditionary in character and design, able to execute the full range of missions.”53   
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53 Background briefing on NATO Response Force from the Colorado Springs Defense Ministers 
Meeting available at [www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf].  13 November 2003; 
emphasis in the original.   
From its inception, the NATO Response Force became a tangible manifestation of 
most of NATO’s goals in the post-11 September 2001 security environment – from 
improving NATO’s military capabilities to continuing the transformation of the Alliance 
from a static defensive organization to one capable of responding quickly to threats and 
challenges distant from NATO territory.  According to General James Jones (SACEUR), 
“the NRF embodies NATO’s ongoing transformation and is vital in order to meet the new 
and very dangerous threats of the 21st century that are so different from those of the Cold 
War era.”54   
The NATO Response Force is designed specifically to be NATO’s high readiness 
force certified to meet asymmetrical threats and challenges.  According to an official 
NATO statement, 
The NATO Response Force (NRF) will be a coherent, high readiness, 
joint, multinational force package, technologically advanced, flexible, 
deployable, interoperable and sustainable.  It will be tailored as required to 
the needs of a specific operation and able to move quickly to wherever 
needed.  The NRF will be able to carry out certain missions on its own, or 
serve as part of a larger force to contribute to the full range of Alliance 
military operations.55   
This force will be based on six-month rotations of committed sea, air, and land 
forces under the operational control of one of NATO’s three operational headquarters 
under Allied Command Operations (ACO).56  ACO at SHAPE is responsible for each 
NRF creation and force generation while Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, 
Virginia, is responsible for the integration of new technologies, doctrine and training for 
the NRF in addition to determining the “lessons learned” from each NRF iteration and 
preparing recommendations for further improvements to the Supreme Allied Commander 
– Operations (SAC-O). 
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55 “The NATO Response Force: At The Center of NATO Transformation.”  Available at 
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With much hope and fanfare, the first NATO Response Force (NRF 1) was 
inaugurated on 15 October 2003 at Joint Force Command North in Brunssum, the 
Netherlands.  At the ceremony, General Sir Jack Deverell (CINCNORTH), stated that the 
creation of the NRF was “a major step forward in creating the expeditionary capability, 
essential to countering the globalisation of new threats to peace and security” and that it 
would lead to a “new, revitalized and relevant Alliance.”57  Under his command, the first 
two iterations (NRF 1 and NRF 2) will serve as the prototype forces during the initial 
operating phase with full operational capability envisioned for the NRF by the fall of 
2006.  At full operational capability, the NRF is to be a 20,000-strong combined force 
that includes a brigade size land element, a joint naval task force, and an air element 
capable of generating two hundred combat sorties a day.58  In addition to these core 
forces, special operations forces can be augmented into the NRF structure as needed.  
Each NRF is designed to be able to operate independently for a thirty-day period and 
longer if re-supplied.   
The land component of the NRF will be drawn from high-readiness forces already 
available to NATO.  This brigade-size element will include a mix of light infantry, 
artillery and air defense support, engineering and reconnaissance units, and psychological 
operations teams.  
The NRF’s air component will provide a rapid deployment capability; and, 
according to officers on NATO’s International Military Staff, it will be able to conduct 
“the full range of air tasks using advanced air-to-air and precision guided air-to-surface 
munitions… and conduct the functions of air defense, air reconnaissance, close air 
support, air interdiction, combat search and rescue, target acquisition, airborne early 
warning, and tactical airlift.”59  Speaking at the Transatlantic Center of the German 
Marshall Fund in Brussels in October 2002, General Joseph Ralston, then Supreme Allied 
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Commander Europe, described the NRF’s air element as being able to make extensive 
use of “advanced precision munitions, controlled by a joint modern command structure… 
leveraging information technology to produce near real-time sensor-to-shooter links.”60   
The NRF’s maritime element will be comprised of an amphibious task force with 
requisite air capability (VSTOL aircraft, attack helicopters, etc.), mine counter-measures 
ships, maritime patrol aircraft, and standing naval forces to include surface warships, 
submarines and supply vessels.  This maritime joint task force will include the command 
and control capabilities necessary to integrate into joint operation s fully.   
With all three components together, the NATO Response Force promises to be an 
entity able to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict and apply force in a rapid and 
decisive manner.  According to a NATO briefing about the NRF published in conjunction 
with the meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in October 2003, 
Initially it’s a subset of the NATO Force Structure.  Ultimately it is the 
future NATO Force Structure.61   
With so much at stake for the future of NATO in this new force, it must be asked 
what its central purposes are.  According to NATO, the NRF has four main functions.  
The first is to “provide NATO with a robust and credible high readiness force, which is 
fully trained and certified as a joint combined force, and is able to deploy quickly to 
participate in the full spectrum of NATO missions.”62  One key issue addressed in this 
stated purpose, and worth drawing out for further discussion, is that the NRF is NATO’s 
first truly joint warfighting unit.  While NATO has been prepared to conduct combined 
(multinational) operations for decades and has possessed for many years “high readiness 
forces,” this is the first standing force in NATO’s history that is truly integrated among 
the three main warfare components of sea, air, and land.  As General James Jones 
(SACEUR) stated in October 2003, “For the first time in its history, the Alliance will 
r, land, sea and special operations force under a single have a joint … combined ai                                                 
60 Ralston quoted in Nicholas Fiorenza, “NATO’s New Teeth,” Armed Forces Journal, April 2003, p. 
16. 
61 Background briefing on NATO Response Force from the Colorado Springs Defense Ministers 
Meeting.  Available at [www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf].  13 November 2003; 
emphasis in the original.   
62 Background briefing on NATO Response Force from the Colorado Springs Defense Ministers 
Meeting.  Available at [www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf].  13 November 2003.   
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commander, maintained as a standing rotational force.”63  Due to its ability to conduct 
operations as part of the war on terrorism, the NRF is seen as a crucial element in 
NATO’s transformation and future effectiveness.   
The second stated purpose of the NRF is to “act as a catalyst for collective allied 
focus on capability development.”64  Some authoritative observers of NATO affairs 
argue that this purpose of enhancing “collective allied focus” may be the most important 
legacy of the NRF.  After the bruising debate among the Allies in the months prior to the 
U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq and in view of lingering doubts in some circles 
regarding NATO’s future relevance as an effective military organization, the NRF is seen 
as a constructive project on which the Allies can focus in a concerted effort.  An official 
statement from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in October 
2003 stated that the NRF was “dynamic evidence of NATO member states’ commitment 
to transformation and revitalization of the Alliance.”65   
A critical mechanism in the NRF’s development is the Allied Command 
Transformation.  As part of each NRF iteration, the ACT will examine the effectiveness 
and shortfalls of each NRF and recommend changes to doctrine and other tangible 
improvements.  This “feedback loop” is viewed as a critical factor in producing a NATO 
force of not only proven efficacy but also an instrument for integrated transformation and 
improved interoperability within the Alliance.  If this process is successful, the threat of a 
trans-Atlantic disconnect in military capability and interoperability can be greatly 
diminished.    
 
 
                                                 
63 Jones quoted in “NATO Launches Response Force.”  Available at 
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64 Background briefing on NATO Response Force from the Colorado Springs Defense Ministers 
Meeting.  Available at [www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf]. 13 November 2003.   
65 “NRF-Force for the Future Bullet Highlights.”  Available at 
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The third purpose of the NRF is “to act as the engine for providing the Alliance 
with an expeditionary capability.”66  As stated earlier in this chapter, NATO’s leaders 
have declared that the “theological squabbles”67 over NATO operating beyond Europe 
are long over; yet, there are still obvious deficiencies in NATO’s ability to act in an 
expeditionary manner.  The NRF is designed specially to remedy shortfalls in 
expeditionary capability.  The NATO Response Force includes platforms providing 
strategic lift by land, air and sea.  In addition, the official designation of the NRF 
headquarters’ element is “Deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters,” signifying the 
importance of the NRF’s expeditionary component.    
The final official purpose for the NRF is to “act as a medium for longer term 
capability development in tandem with the Prague Capabilities Commitment.”68  The 
previous section of this chapter identified key elements for capabilities improvement 
within NATO.  The NRF is designed in large part to be a “catalyst for focusing on and 
promoting improvements of Alliance military capabilities, in very close relationship with 
the national and multinational elements of the Prague Capabilities Commitment 
(PCC).”69  The long range planning for the NATO Response Force lays out specific 
capabilities requirements, per the guidelines defined in the PCC, in such critical areas as 
precision guided munitions (PGM) availability.   
NATO’s political-military authorities thereby enunciate tangible capability 
requirements to future participants in NRF rotations and lead NATO in the improvement 
of its capabilities.  The main instrument in coordinating the NRF with the PCC is the 
Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR), which is produced by Allied 
Command Operations (ACO) at SHAPE with inputs from Allied Command 
Transformation and the regional Joint Force Commanders, with ultimate approval by the 
                                                 
66 Background briefing on NATO Response Force from the Colorado Springs Defense Ministers 
Meeting.  Available at [www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf].  13 November 2003.   
67 “NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson’s Speech at the Atlantic Treaty Association’s 49th 
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68 Background briefing on NATO Response Force from the Colorado Springs Defense Ministers 
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69 “The NATO Response Force:  At the Center of NATO Transformation.”  Available at 
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NATO Military Committee.  The purpose of the CJSOR is to provide nations with an 
indication of the type and scale of forces and capabilities required for the NATO 
Response Force.  Through the CJSOR process, NATO will be able to identify and obtain 
the capabilities necessary to conduct various missions.   
The kinds of missions that the NRF may be expected to execute vary across a 
wide spectrum of conflict.  These missions, according to NATO sources, include crisis 
response and peacekeeping, consequence management (including humanitarian crises and 
responding to attacks using weapons of mass destruction), peace enforcement, non-
combatant evacuation operations, and embargo operations (maritime, land, and air), 
including the enforcement of no-fly zones.  In addition to these traditional “low-intensity 
conflict” operations, other possible NRF missions include support to counter terror 
operations, use as an initial entry force, and lastly, employment as a demonstrative force 
package that could rapidly deploy as a show of force to deter aggression.70    
The NATO Response Force continues to develop into one of the key vehicles for 
NATO’s transformation for the new security environment.  The first NATO exercises 
involving NRF staff and operational elements took place less than three weeks after the 
establishment of the first NRF on 15 October 2003.  Exercise Allied Action 2003 was a 
NATO Command Post Exercise that took place in Istanbul, Turkey, from 2-18 November 
2003.  It was conducted by Regional Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe 
(AFNORTH)71 and served to validate AFNORTH as a operational level headquarters 
capable of organizing and commanding a fully deployable Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF).72 The participants in this exercise practiced the procedures for planning and 
mounting a multinational crisis response operation beyond Alliance territory.73  This staff 
exercise was followed by the first NATO Response Force exercise, which was conducted 
at Doganbey, Turkey, on 20 November 2003.  Exercise Allied Response 2003 
highlighted capabilities of the NRF in a field-training scenario portraying a NATO-led 
                                                 
70 Background briefing on NATO Response Force from the Colorado Springs Defense Ministers 
Meeting.  Available at [www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf].  13 November 2003.   
71 Both RHQ AFNORTH and JFC NORTH are commonly used to denote the same command.   
72 AFNORTH’s permanent headquarters is located in Brunssum, the Netherlands.   
73 “NATO Conducts Combined Joint Task Force Exercise in Turkey.”  Available at 
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28 
crisis response operation beyond NATO’s area of responsibility.  The exercise depicted 
the NRF conducting maritime presence, show of force, counter-terrorism, and 
noncombatant evacuation and embargo operations.74  This was quite impressive 
considering that it was only a year prior to this exercise that the NRF concept was first 
adopted.  
For forty years, from 1949 to 1989, NATO forces organized, trained, and 
equipped mainly to deter and defeat (if necessary) military aggression on the European 
continent.  Since the early 1990’s, the Allies have been adapting their capabilities and 
concepts of operations to conduct crisis response and peacekeeping activities.  Since the 
late 1990’s, and particularly since the terrorist attacks against the United States in 
September 2001, the Allies have been carrying forward the process of adaptation and 
transformation to deal with new threats and challenges.  Since terrorist and WMD 
proliferation threats to the Atlantic Alliance may arise around the globe, NATO’s 
challenge is to field expeditionary forces capable of speed, power, and interoperability to 
counter such threats.  The NATO Response Force, if brought to its full potential, is 
capable of meeting such a challenge.   
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III. TRANS-ATLANTIC OBSTACLES TO NATO’S ACTIVE AND 
EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON 
TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION:  9/11 AND THE DEBATE OVER NATO’S FUTURE 
COURSE 
NATO’s shift in strategic focus, the reorganization of the NATO military 
command structure, and the establishment of the NATO Response Force constitute a 
significant turning point in the history of the Atlantic Alliance.  NATO’s stated objectives 
in combating the global terrorist threat are both impressive and visionary.  However, 
serious obstacles must be effectively addressed for NATO to fully realize its objectives in 
the global war on terrorism.   
These obstacles have both political and military dimensions.  In the political 
sphere, serious debate persists over how global a role NATO should have.  Considerable 
differences over preventive and preemptive options among NATO members could 
undermine NATO’s effectiveness in the war on terrorism.  Moreover, NATO’s military 
capability is of critical importance to achieving its objectives.  NATO’s vision for 
combating terrorism relies on a robust expeditionary capability; yet it is imperative that 
NATO substantially improve its military capabilities to satisfy such requirements.   
B. THE POLITICAL COMPONENT:  TRANS-ATLANTIC STRAINS AS 
OBSTACLES TO NATO’S WILLINGNESS AND POLITICAL EFFICACY 
TOWARD AN INCREASED GLOBAL ROLE 
The debate about an increased global role for NATO did not materialize after 11 
September 2001.  Former U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and former 
Secretary of Defense William Perry argued as follows in October 1997: 
Shifting the alliance’s emphasis from defense of members’ territory to 
defense of common interests is the strategic imperative.  These threats 
include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the 
flow of oil, terrorism, genocidal violence and wars of aggression in other 
regions that threaten to create great disruption.  To deal with such threats,  
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alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form military coalitions 
that can accomplish goals beyond NATO territory….  For NATO to 
succeed, it must develop the ability to respond to today’s security needs.75 
The European members of NATO historically received such proposals with 
caution.  David S. Yost wrote in 1998 that many of the European allies viewed the idea of 
a NATO with global missions negatively.  Yost described how Europeans  
generally find more difficulties than advantages in the ‘global NATO’ 
concept.  In their view, attempting to institutionalize global security 
functions in NATO might well prove to be counterproductive and 
damaging to Alliance cohesion and to the maintenance of U.S. leadership 
in the Alliance.76   
For example, in 1997 Michael Rühle and Nick Williams wrote as follows on this 
topic: 
[A]n attempt to rally the European allies into quasi-automatic action on 
the global stage is bound to fail… [O]ne would be hard-pressed to come 
up with scenarios which would suggest joint military action of all 16 
NATO allies outside Europe.77   
Many would contend that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 constitute 
precisely the scenario one would normally be “hard pressed to come up with.”  Yet while 
it can be argued that those attacks constituted a watershed event with the requisite power 
and momentum to bring about changes in NATO’s doctrine, many contend that the 
national security policy of the United States since September 2001 has led to a 
squandering of European goodwill.  This is due in large measure to the unease in much of 
Europe concerning the American doctrine of preemption.  The following policy statement 
summarizes the U.S. strategic doctrine of preemption: 
Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no 
longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past.  The 
inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, 
and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our 
weapons, do not permit that option...  The United adversaries’ choice of 
                                                 
75 Christopher and Perry, “NATO’s True Mission,” New York Times, 21 October 1997, quoted in 
David S. Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in International Security (Washington, D.C.: 
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76 Ibid., p. 224. 
77 Michael Rühle and Nick Williams, “Why NATO Will Survive,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 16 
(January / March 1997), p. 112, quoted in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 245. 
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States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a 
sufficient threat to our national security.  The greater the threat, the greater 
is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking 
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to 
the time and place of the enemy’s attack.  To forestall or prevent such 
hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act 
preemptively.78 
This new doctrine, which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine, has 
contributed to a surge in trans-Atlantic tensions.79  Many Europeans (and others) argue 
that such a policy threatens international security and world order.  Since NATO is an 
intergovernmental organization based on consensus as the foundation for any action, such 
tensions could become a serious obstacle to NATO’s future willingness to undertake an 
increased global role.   
Perhaps nowhere has this strain been more evident than in the political and 
diplomatic wrangling leading to the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq in March-April 2003.  
The determination of fellow NATO allies France and Germany to block U.S. action 
caused significant damage in the relationship with America.  The criticisms expressed by 
some members of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s government about the 
policies of U.S. President George W. Bush resulted in a “poisoned atmosphere” in the 
German-American relationship, according to U.S. National Security Advisor 
Condoleezza Rice.80  The stoking of these emotions could lead to fracture within an 
alliance based on common interests, goals, and values.  NATO Secretary-General Lord 
Robertson commented on this phenomenon in May 2003:   
I’m very worried about anti-Americanism because I think it is deeply 
corrosive to a relationship that is critically important for the overall 
security of the world.  If they [the United States] continue to be criticized 
in that unreasoning and emotive way, then I see disengagement being the  
                                                 
78 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.:  The White House, 
September 2002), p. 15. 
79 For a description of the development of the Bush Doctrine, please see Frontline’s “The War Behind 
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outcome and that being much more dangerous to all of us than American 
involvement or interventionism…  It is a generic attack on America and 
American standards and American values and approaches.81  
Many have argued that French foreign policy under President Jacques Chirac is 
largely based on countering increasing American power on the world stage and 
particularly in Europe.  This took the form of active opposition to United States policy on 
the Iraq question and, according to Stefan Kornelius, the “forging of an entente directed 
against the United States.”82  Many in France have come to view the United States as 
“l’hyperpuissance américaine” – the American hyperpower – that must be countered by 
France.  Marcel H. van Herpen, director of the pro-EU Cicero Foundation, cogently 
explained French policy as being characterized by three core assumptions: France 
considers itself a pivotal great power; France can only play this role in a multipolar 
world; and France considers multilateral decision-making in such a world the best 
guarantee of international security.83  
Van Herpen explains that this is why France favors a strong role for international 
forums, particularly the United Nations Security Council, of which it is a permanent 
member.  By enhancing this multilateral institution, it is argued, France will not only 
promote multipolarity but also confirm its status as a world power.  This policy, 
according to van Herpen, will only be solidified in the coming years under Chirac.  Now 
enjoying greater domestic political leverage, Chirac can  
do what he already long ago decided to do: to systemically oppose 
American power in order to create a second, countervailing power.  In this 
strategy, he considers Germany and some [economically] smaller 
European states, including Russia, and possibly China, to be his natural 
allies.84  
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It seems that one can add India to the list of countries that some French officials 
would like to recruit in their campaign for multipolarity.  According to the Times of 
India, during a visit to New Delhi in April 2003, French Defense Minister Michèle 
Alliot-Marie, a close political confidante of the French President, indicated that countries 
with “a similar vision” of an international order based on multipolarity should come 
together to act as a counterweight against the perceived unilateralist policies of the 
United States in international affairs.85  Such references to a “multipolar” world by 
French officials illustrate their desire to check the perceived preponderance of American 
power.   
If France was successful in persuading its fellow members of the European Union 
to reduce their military dependence on the United States and to pursue policies at 
variance with those favored by Washington, this could undermine U.S. influence globally 
and within NATO in particular.  Such diplomatic discord could obstruct NATO’s 
movement toward playing a more global role against the terrorist threat.  Alain Madelin, 
a member of the French Parliament and a former cabinet minister under Chirac, delivered 
his perspective on France’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States in compelling terms 
in a speech in Washington, D.C.: 
Today, you should know that France’s foreign policy crystallizes all the 
anti-American tendencies of the French society.  A part of the French 
population is jealous and resentful of American power.  Anti-Americanism 
is a flag for those who lost their flag.  This anti-Americanism is put forth 
by the orphans of Marxism…  Finally, there is the nostalgia for the 
Gaullist posture and the idea that the only way to recover international 
standing is for France and Europe to oppose the United States.86 
If there was any doubt about the seriousness of such aspirations, it was removed 
on 19 April 2003 when the leaders of Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxembourg 
announced the establishment of a “European Security and Defense Union.”  Many have 
dismissed this summit as both feckless and reckless, but the underlying message was 
widely seen as an intention to weaken the trans-Atlantic security relationship.  The 
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declared intention was to establish a “multinational deployable force headquarters” and a 
“nucleus of collective capability for planning and conducting operations for the European 
Union.”87  While the four leaders repeatedly stated that their initiative was not in 
opposition to NATO, the functions proposed would duplicate those of NATO.  Robert 
Greene wrote that it could only mean one thing: “France, having seen the UN Security 
Council sidelined in Iraq, has decided it needs a serious military alliance, not a talking 
shop, to stand up to America.”88  This drew a strong response from the U.S. Ambassador 
to NATO, Nicholas Burns: 
Some Europeans…think they can create a unified continental foreign 
policy with opposition to the United States as its raison d’être.  They call 
for European-only military headquarters that would needlessly duplicate 
what NATO already offers and have zero real utility, unless the objective 
is to weaken our ability to work together.  Their vision of Europe as a 
countervailing power to the United States is one that would destroy the 
cooperative spirit that has held us together in NATO.89 
The United States made clear that it would not soon forget the division within the 
Alliance.  In April 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, “We have to look at all 
aspects of our relationship with France in light of this.”90  These developments could 
seriously damage the Alliance and no doubt some damage has already been done.  
Speaking in Berlin in June 2003, NATO Secretary-General Robertson admitted that 
damage to the Atlantic Alliance had indeed occurred during the debate leading up to the 
U.S.-led intervention in Iraq in 2003.  Yet in Robertson’s view such damage “was 
superficial, above the waterline.”91  It is important that the repairs to the damage be 
successful and durable.   
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It should be noted that well before the tension in 2002-2003 over the U.S.-led 
military action in Iraq, the idea that NATO could initiate offensive military operations 
against WMD proliferants was considered unrealistic.  Writing in 1994, Michael Rühle 
described the magnitude of the obstacles to such action: 
NATO, given its democratic, multinational, and defensive nature, is 
incapable of any deliberately planned offensive action…  [I]t is simply 
inconceivable that NATO Allies would find the political will to launch a 
preventive military strike even against the facilities of a state which 
persisted in its development of WMD in the light of international 
opposition.92 
In light of the trans-Atlantic tensions manifested during the debate prior to the 
U.S.-led intervention in Iraq and the failure to date to find stockpiles of WMD within 
Iraq, it remains uncertain whether NATO will ever be willing to adopt a policy of 
preventive action.  This implies that NATO is more likely to contribute to the war on 
terrorism in areas such as post-conflict security-building.   
C. THE MILITARY COMPONENT:  THE TRANS-ATLANTIC 
CAPABILITIES GAP AS AN OBSTACLE TO NATO’S EFFECTIVENESS 
IN AN INCREASED GLOBAL ROLE 
America’s European allies must now begin to meet their commitments to 
address rapidly the alarming imbalances in airlift, precision-guided 
munitions, air-to-air refueling, and secure communications.  Without these 
capabilities, most European nations will not, in the future, be able to 
meaningfully contribute to modern military operations, making hollow 
any plans for a serious European-American security partnership.93 
Nicholas Burns, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, 24 May 2003 
Even if the Allies overcome their current divisions and provide the necessary 
political leadership and support for a significant role in the global struggle against 
terrorism, it will be for naught if NATO continues to lack the military capability to 
assume the requisite increased global role effectively.  As Secretary-General Lord 
Robertson said to the Council on Foreign Relations in April 2002:   
                                                 
92 Michael Rühle, “NATO and the Coming Proliferation Threat,” Comparative Strategy, vol. 13 (July 
– September 1994), pp. 317-318, quoted in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed:  The Alliance’s New Roles 
in International Security (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1998), pp. 245-246. 
93 Nicholas Burns, “NATO Has Adapted: An Alliance with A New Mission,” International Herald 
Tribune, 24 May 2003.   
37 
By invoking Article V of the Washington Treaty, NATO gave a warning 
to terrorists that they had crossed an unacceptable threshold.  We must 
now back up that warning by ensuring that our forces have the evident 
capability to strike at these terrorists and their sponsors.  And we must 
stop those who are proliferating the weapons of mass destruction that pose 
the most serious risk.94    
The much-discussed military capabilities gap between the United States and its 
European and Canadian allies matters in this debate regarding NATO and the war on 
terrorism since it is a significant obstacle to NATO’s future effectiveness – particularly if 
NATO is to play an increased global role.  
Like the debate on a global role for NATO, this topic was an issue within the 
Alliance well before Article 5 was invoked on 12 September 2001.  The general 
consensus is that the United States has surged ahead of its European allies in technology 
investment, C4ISR,95 strategic air and sealift, secure communications, and deep strike 
capabilities – all necessary and critical elements of an effective power projection force.  
While many components constitute this gap, 
The United States is currently superior to any combination of its European 
allies in its ability to plan, conduct and sustain theater-wide expeditionary 
operations.  Of all the NATO allies, only the United States can project 
power in the form of large-scale long-range non-nuclear air and missile 
strikes at great distances from its homeland.96 
This disparity was manifest in NATO’s air campaign in the Kosovo conflict – 
Operation Allied Force.  During this conflict, the United States delivered over 80% of the 
weapons, even though non-U.S. aircraft carried out 39% of all sorties.  The strike sorties 
non-U.S. aircraft executed could not have taken place without crucial American support 
aircraft.  Many of the key capabilities for Operation Allied Force (SEAD,97 airborne 
command and control, electronic warfare, all-weather targeting, and time sensitive  
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targeting) were handled almost entirely by U.S. forces.98  In addition to these gaps, the 
importance of expeditionary capability was another key lesson learned from Operation 
Allied Force.  Lieutenant Colonel Michael Lamb, USAF, observes that  
Operation Allied Force demonstrated that the United States and its allies 
have very different levels of expeditionary capability and strategic lift.  
The United States provided almost all of the dedicated military air and 
sealift used during the campaign.  It was clear that the United States had a 
distinct advantage in many areas of expeditionary capability.99    
Such a gap in expeditionary capability for operations within Europe demonstrates 
the severe limitations on any ambitions for future global operations. 
The same capabilities lacking in Operation Allied Force are exponentially more 
essential to combat and coalition effectiveness in a war involving the asymmetric 
challenges posed by terrorism.  A war against terrorists, or against state regimes with 
actual or possible WMD capabilities, relies heavily on precise intelligence, highly trained 
and professional personnel, advanced technology and modern, integrated platforms.  An 
initial look at national levels of defense spending causes the United States and its 
European and Canadian allies to appear as if they were not even in the same alliance.  
The United States’ increase in defense spending of $48 billion for 2003 was larger than 
any other NATO ally’s total defense budget for that year.100  In the arena of investing in 
new capabilities, Europe spent $10 billion on military research and development while 
the United States spent $50 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003.101  In response to this 
growing capabilities gap between the United States and its NATO Allies, one German 
official has said, “At this rate, we won’t be able to communicate with you [the United 
States], much less fight alongside you.”102  It should also be noted that if prosperous 
long-standing NATO members such as Britain, France, and Germany are having 
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difficulty keeping up with U.S. defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP, then it can 
only be expected that the new members, who are already at an economic disadvantage, 
will be faced with an even more difficult, if not impossible, task in meeting NATO’s 
stated goals of increasing its capabilities.     
One of the most troubling components of the capabilities gap concerns 
interoperability and information sharing.  U.S. forces increasingly rely on the 
SIPRNET103 for communications in nearly every facet of combat operations, including 
intelligence and targeting information, logistics, and plans and schedules.  This secure 
means of coordination and information sharing is classified “SECRET NOFORN” – that 
is, no access or release to foreign nationals is permitted – and, while it has proven a boon 
to U.S. combat capability, it remains a critical obstacle to interoperability between the 
United States and its NATO allies.   
Many would counter that the lack of interoperability is not such a grave issue due 
to NATO’s information sharing capability in the LOCE system.104  However, this system 
is limited by both low bandwidth capability and the fact that not all U.S. forces are 
equipped with LOCE connectivity.  This was demonstrated vividly during Operation 
Enduring Freedom.  Most U.S. naval forces based on the east coast of the United States 
are equipped with LOCE due to the frequency of NATO-sponsored joint exercises 
involving those units.  U.S. naval forces operating out of the Pacific are generally not 
equipped with LOCE since they do not participate in NATO exercises.  During Operation 
Enduring Freedom, Pacific-based carrier battle groups were not able to communicate via 
LOCE to other coalition forces.105  This situation reflects what François Heisbourg, 
undation for Strategic Research, said when he described director of the Paris-based Fo                                                 
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shortcomings in NATO interoperability as a major obstacle to an increased global 
mission, notably because of what he called “increasing disengagement” from NATO by 
the United States, for various reasons. 
These include the end of the Cold War and the corresponding relegation in 
importance of the European theater of operations; the increasingly 
autonomous nature of US theater commands, most of which – PACOM, 
CENTCOM, NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM – are not accustomed to NATO 
procedures, standards and norms; and of course, the growing capabilities 
gap between Europe and the United States, with its growing impact on 
European militaries’ ability to interface fully with their US counterparts.  
With some 92 percent of the US force structure outside NATO, what will 
be the future meaning of NATO interoperability?106 
Serious military reform is indeed necessary not only in interoperability and 
weapons capability, but in the force structure itself.  With some rare exceptions, most 
NATO European armed forces are still designed to fight the continental land battle 
dreaded during the Cold War.  These European allies continue to maintain forces laden 
with unnecessary personnel, composed largely of conscripts that possess little ability for 
complex global operations.  As Secretary-General Lord Robertson stated in Moscow on 9 
December 2002: 
The military forces of yesterday – huge arsenals of battle tanks, static 
headquarters and inflexible soldiers -- are not only useless in meeting 
these new threats [of terrorism]; but they also divert scarce defense 
resources away from urgent and pressing modernization.107 
While there remains wasteful and inefficient use of national defense funding in 
needless and duplicative efforts, this unnecessary allocation of manpower serves as a 
costly encumbrance to already constrained national defense budgets.  As François 
Heisbourg has pointed out: 
the single most important cause of the massive discrepancy between the 
US and European capabilities flows from European force structure 
policies… Indeed, the Europeans reign supreme in one area, that of 
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unusable and ultimately unaffordable manpower.  The forces of the 
European Union countries field 1.9 million under uniform versus 1.4 
million in the US…  The net effect is that after spending for the 
corresponding force structures, there is little left for European R&D 
[research and development], acquisition or for O&M [operations and 
maintenance] spending.108 
Overcoming this disparity in trans-Atlantic military capabilities will certainly be a 
vast task.  Improvements in capabilities must include the critical areas of chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear defense; intelligence, surveillance and target 
acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; precision 
guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD); strategic air and sea 
lift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units.  
If the capabilities gap between the United States and the other NATO allies continues to 
grow, it will undermine the Alliance as an effective and interoperable defense 
organization.   
This gap in military capabilities, coupled with the trans-Atlantic obstacles 
heretofore discussed, poses vexing problems for the Atlantic Alliance as it struggles to 
find its place in the campaign against the global terrorist threat.  These obstacles are not 
insurmountable, and they must be effectively addressed and overcome in order for NATO 
to be a truly effective participant in the global war on terrorism.    
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 not only dramatically altered U.S. 
national security policy, they also fundamentally changed the strategic focus of NATO.  
They constituted, in essence, a necessary wake-up call for the Atlantic Alliance.  The 
terrorist attacks demonstrated that the primary immediate threat to peace and security in 
both Europe and North America originates beyond NATO’s traditional area of 
responsibility; and a NATO still laden to a significant extent with a Cold War-era 
military infrastructure can do little to contribute to combating this new strategic threat.  A 
substantially transformed NATO is clearly required in order to effectively counter such 
threats and actively participate in the new global war on terrorism.  Such a transformation 
of NATO will have the added effect of ensuring its relevance in countering the 
asymmetric threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.       
In introducing the U.S. National Security Strategy, released in September 2002, 
President George W. Bush declared that “the gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the 
crossroads of radicalism and technology” and that “History will judge harshly those who 
saw this coming danger but failed to act.”109  NATO has largely answered this challenge 
to act by transforming itself with the purpose of effectively countering this nexus of 
“radicalism and technology” wherever such a threat may arise.  In short, the era of a 
global NATO has arrived.   
With the attacks of 11 September 2001 still vivid in memory, and the growing 
threat emanating from beyond Europe becoming more real, NATO’s leaders, in the 
Prague Summit Declaration issued on 21 November 2002, categorically rejected and 
condemned terrorism in all its forms and recognized that it “poses a grave and growing 
threat to Alliance populations, forces and territory, as well as to international security; 
and we are determined to combat this scourge for as long as necessary.  To combat 
terrorism effectively, our response must be multi-faceted and comprehensive.”110  While 
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these words are promising, acting on them will entail meeting today’s terrorist threat with 
as unified a strategic response as the Allies mustered against the threat posed by the 
Soviet Union.  
NATO has begun to respond to the terrorist threat by dramatically shifting its 
strategic focus toward a more deployable and flexible force posture.  This shift in 
strategic focus has been manifested in NATO’s Military Concept for Defense Against 
Terrorism, its undertaking of command responsibilities in Afghanistan, and the dramatic 
streamlining of its integrated military command structure.  NATO has also established a 
framework for transforming its military capabilities through the Prague Capabilities 
Commitment and Allied Command Transformation.  These represent tangible 
commitments designed to ensure continued interoperability and cohesion within the 
Atlantic Alliance.  Lastly, the NATO Response Force is considered a major step toward 
NATO’s transformation to an alliance capable of conducting joint warfare on a global 
scale, and it has been heralded as the primary instrument for NATO operations in the 
future.    
Yet even with recognition of the growing need for NATO to play a global role to 
combat the threats posed by terrorism, serious political obstacles for NATO to be truly 
effective in this new era persist.  Growing anti-Americanism, due in large part to 
perceived unilateralism on the part of the United States, has encouraged those who 
believe that the European Union must now chart its own course and be responsible for its 
own security, without any assistance from the United States.  This attitude may further 
undermine the trust and cooperation necessary for continued Allied cohesion.    
The European Union’s senior military officer, General Gustav Hagglund, recently 
suggested that “American and European forces should be responsible for their own 
territorial defence and only cooperate on major crises outside their regions.”111  While 
General Hagglund was not speaking for the European Union or for his own country, 
Finland, which is not a NATO member, such sentiments could nonetheless ultimately 
undermine the foundations of NATO if they became widely shared.  Indeed, such 
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sentiments could, if taken to their logical conclusion, lead to a termination of the Atlantic 
Alliance, which is based on the mutual defense pledge in Article 5 of the 1949 
Washington Treaty.    
In addition to the political obstacles that must be overcome, the challenge of 
enhancing the capabilities of NATO forces is exacerbated by the low level of domestic 
support for military expenditures in Canada and most of NATO Europe.  With few 
exceptions (e.g., France and the United Kingdom), most NATO nations have 
demonstrated little enthusiasm for increased defense budgets, and in times of economic 
uncertainty defense budgets are usually cut before social programs and other 
entitlements.   
To counter this tendency, in the Prague Capabilities Commitment NATO 
governments have made politically binding pledges to acquire specific operational assets.  
NATO member nations understand that they must transform their military force 
structures in order to provide a more efficient pool of well-trained and properly equipped 
personnel.  These nations also have a clear responsibility to convince their publics of the 
importance of the Alliance’s increasingly global role and the necessary contribution 
required for such missions.   
To ensure the continued success and vitality of NATO, leaders on both sides of 
the Atlantic must strive to keep it in a place of unquestioned primacy as the foundation 
for security in the Euro-Atlantic region.  Cooperation must replace antagonism, and 
common security interests must overcome disagreements over policy.  Too much is at 
stake for any other course of action.    
NATO helped ensure the defense of Western Europe during the Cold War.  Since 
the early 1990’s, it has engaged in efforts to stabilize regions where, if left unchecked, 
disorders could lead to escalating conflict and, ultimately, increased threats to NATO 
nations.  It is clearly in NATO’s interests to contribute to peace and stability in strategic 
regions well beyond Europe that are marred by violence and instability.    
The new anti-terrorism mission that NATO has embraced carries many risks, but 
it also constitutes an enormous opportunity to invigorate an alliance whose future was 
uncertain only a short time ago.  The active and effective involvement of NATO in the 
45 
global war on terrorism offers tremendous benefits to Alliance security and promotes the 
cooperation between nations that is critical to defeating this global menace.  Yet in order 
for such an endeavor to be successful, each member nation of the Alliance must view 
terrorism as an on-going threat to its own population and institutions and must, therefore, 
adapt its own capabilities in order to counter this threat in an effective, unified and 
forceful way.   
In order for this global war against terrorism to be won, the members of the 
Atlantic Alliance must never forget the lessons of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001.  Victory over terrorism and the continued relevance of NATO are by no means 
foregone conclusions.  Statesmanship of the highest order and effective leadership of this 
long-standing alliance will be required in order to enable NATO to confront and triumph 
over the daunting challenges of the new century.   
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